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I. INTRODUCTION
The Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 19881 (Polygraph Act)
prohibits the use of polygraph examinations by private employers ac-
tively participating in commerce or producing goods for interstate com-
merce.2 Prior to this federal action, forty-one states had addressed the
issue of employer use of polygraph examinations. Twelve states and the
District of Columbia prohibit employer use of polygraph tests alto-
gether. Of the remaining states, some require licensing of examiners
and others regulate the circumstances under which an employer may
require polygraph examination of an employee.3 According to the legis-
lative history, federal legislation is necessary because state regulations
are ineffective: existing state statutes are not enforced and employers
circumvent state laws by pressuring employees into volunteering for the
tests or by administering the tests in states without regulations.4 Con-
gress concluded that a uniform national policy was needed to eliminate
the use of polygraph examinations in the workplace.'
The Polygraph Act is justified as an exercise of the power granted
to Congress by the interstate commerce clause of the United States
Constitution.' Modern commerce clause doctrine has become known as
the "rational basis" test because it permits federal regulation of any
activity that Congress reasonably concludes has a substantial effect on
interstate commerce.' Since 1937, when the United States Supreme
Court began using the rational basis test, only one legislative effort has
been held to be beyond the scope of the federal commerce power, and
that holding was recently overruled.8 In both theory and practice the
interstate commerce clause has evolved into the primary source of fed-
eral power over individual conduct.
The rational basis test supports legislation that regulates purely lo-
1. Pub. L. No. 100-347, 102 Stat. 646 (to be codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2001-2009).
2. Id. § 3(2), 102 Stat. 646.
3. HOUSE COMM. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, REPORT ON EMPLOYEE POLYGRAPH PROTECTION
ACT, H.R. REP. No. 208, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9 (1987).
4. Id. at 9.
5. The Act "would uniformly ban the use of these tests by most private employers. This
legislation would protect workers who are wrongfully denied employment and whose careers are
devastated because of lie detector test inaccuracies and employer abuses." Id. at 4.
6. That clause provides that "Congress shall have Power... [tjo regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
7. See infra notes 117-21 and accompanying text.
8. In 1976 the United States Supreme Court invalidated certain amendments to the Fair
Labor Standards Act that would have brought state and local governments within the provisions of
that Act. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). For a discussion of these two cases, see infra
notes 122-48 and accompanying text. Prior to National League of Cities, the most recent invalida-
tion of commerce legislation occurred in Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
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cal behavior for the purpose of promoting or protecting the public
health, welfare, or morality.9 The Polygraph Act is merely a single ex-
ample of such regulation. During the past century Congress has used its
power under the commerce clause to regulate a wide range of activi-
ties-from prostitution 0 to loan sharking, 1" from the number of toilets
in factories 2 to the location of restroom facilities on farms employing
eleven or more farm hands, s from the minimum age of child laborers1 4
to the minimum age of forced-retirees. 15 Not only has the commerce
clause become the source of federal police power," it has become an
unlimited source.
The growth of the federal police power based on the commerce
clause disrupts the delicately balanced federal system. As federal power
expands, state governments are displaced from their traditional role as
the primary authority over individuals. Individuals increasingly are gov-
erned by a large federal bureaucracy that is not as accountable, demo-
cratic, or responsive as state and local governments and which cannot
provide for local diversity. The demise of federalism ultimately will
threaten individual rights because centralization eventually leads to
regulation without adequate representation. This Note offers an inter-
pretation of the commerce clause that would restrain the exercise of
federal police power in order to preserve the benefits of state regulation
while allowing congressional legislation when necessary.
Part H reviews the evolution of the commerce power from its ori-
gins at the Constitutional Convention through the major cases of this
century out of which the modern interpretation has developed. Part Ill
addresses the actual threat posed by federal usurpation of state author-
ity by examining the continued value of state governments in an age
when technological advances blur state lines and homogenize the popu-
lation. Part IV proposes to confine the exercise of federal police power
to situations in which the commerce clause forbids or compromises
state regulation. Part V concludes by suggesting that the Supreme
Court must resume its traditional role as protector of individual rights
9. See Cirillo & Eisenhofer, Reflections on the Congressional Commerce Power, 60 TEMP.
L.Q. 901, 912 (1987).
10. See White Slave Traffic Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421-2424 (1982 & Supp. 1988).
11. See Extortionate Credit Transactions Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 891-896 (1982).
12. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.141(c) (1987).
13. See id. § 1928.110.
14. See 29 U.S.C. § 212 (1982).
15. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982 & Supp. 1988).
16. The term "police power" refers to the power "to place restraints on the personal freedom
and property rights of persons for the protection of the public safety, health, and morals or the
promotion of the public convenience and general prosperity." BLACK'S LAW DIcoNARY 1041 (5th
ed. 1979).
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by defining meaningful limits on federal power.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL POLICE POWER
In his concurring opinion to Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &
Reclamation Association,'1 then-Associate Justice Rehnquist wrote that
modern commerce clause interpretation leaves one with the impression
that federalism exists only at the sufferance of Congress."8 If this state-
ment accurately reflects the situation in 1981, prior to the demise of the
Court's only recent attempt to restrict congressional power, 19 then fed-
eralism must be greatly threatened now. This has not always been the
case, however. In fact, the expansion of federal power under the com-
merce clause only began with the administration of President Franklin
Roosevelt. During the first century under the Constitution, Congress
rarely attempted to exercise its power over interstate commerce."0
When statutes justified as commerce regulations were challenged as un-
constitutional, the Supreme Court often was inconsistent in its hold-
ings. The evolution of the modern commerce power has been
authoritatively traced in detail by other commentators.2' This section
briefly discusses some of the highlights of the development in order to
provide the background necessary to understand modern commerce
clause doctrine.
A. The Origin of the Commerce Clause
Any endeavor to interpret the text of the Constitution naturally
begins with the original intent of the Framers and the understanding of
the ratifiers of that document. Anyone attempting to discover the origi-
nal intent behind the commerce clause is struck by the paucity of dis-
cussion the clause generated in Philadelphia, at the ratifying
conventions, and in contemporary writings. At the Philadelphia Con-
vention, the interstate commerce clause was agreed to without dissent
and there was a similar lack of opposition at the state ratifying conven-
tions. 22 The Federalist contains very little discussion of the commerce
clause, with only a small percentage of that consideration devoted to
17. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
18. Id. at 308 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
19. For a discussion of Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528
(1985) (overruling National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)), see infra notes 122-48
and accompanying text.
20. See G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 103 (11th ed. 1985).
21. See generally P. BENSON, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE, 1937-1970
(1970); Stern, The Commerce Clause and the National Economy, 1933-1946 (pts. 1 & 2), 59 HARV.
L. REV. 645, 883 (1946).
22. Abel, The Commerce Clause in the Constitutional Convention and in Contemporary
Comment, 25 MINN. L. REV. 432, 443-44 (1941).
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the interstate commerce power.2 3 In short, the interstate commerce
clause was conspicuously uncontroversial to the original Framers and
ratifiers.24
Most of the discussion regarding the commerce clause focused on
the federal power over foreign commerce. 25 In fact, the Framers appar-
ently considered the commerce power synonymous with power over for-
eign commerce.26 After some debate at the Convention, the Framers
eventually agreed that Congress would exercise its commerce power
through fiscal regulation of imports and exports, passage of a navigation
act, and regulation of those engaged in the import-export business-all
matters relating to foreign commerce. James Madison's writings in
The Federalist indicate that the power over interstate commerce was
substantially an adjunct to the power over external commerce.2 8 By re-
moving state-imposed barriers to foreign trade, the interstate commerce
clause made American markets more attractive to foreigners.2 9
During the ratification debates the Anti-Federalists continuously
urged that the new Constitution gave too much power to the federal
government," but they never raised objections to the interstate com-
merce power. If the power over commerce among the states was in-
tended by the Framers to be an independent grant of affirmative power
over domestic affairs, then there certainly would have been more con-
flict over it. For example, the southern states would have perceived the
interstate commerce power as a potential threat to the institution of
slavery.31 As further illustration, there is the fact that the proposed sec-
retary of commerce and finance, who was to oversee the commercial in-
23. Id. at 458; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (J. Madison).
24. The only serious conflict over the commerce power was raised by the southern states
because they feared that a navigation act would be detrimental to them. The conflict was resolved
when the southern delegates agreed to the commerce clause as written in exchange for the infa-
mous guarantee that no regulation on the importation of slaves would occur until 1808. Abel,
supra note 22, at 453.
25. Id. at 465; see also Cirillo & Eisenhofer, supra note 9, at 905.
26. Abel, supra note 22, at 455.
27. Id. at 465.
28. Id. at 480-81.
29. See THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 262 (J. Madison) (H. Lodge ed. 1908) (asserting that
without the "supplemental" power to regulate interstate commerce, the power to regulate foreign
commerce would be "incomplete" and "ineffectual"); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 11 (A.
Hamilton).
30. See generally H. STORING, WHAT THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS WERE FOR (1981).
31. The southern delegates were extremely wary of delegating power to the federal govern-
ment that could be used to abolish slavery. The only express protection, however, appears in arti-
cle V of the Constitution which prevents a constitutional amendment regarding slavery until 1808.
Logic dictates that the federal government, under the original Constitution, could not have been
granted power to regulate an activity like slavery. The article V prohibition against amendment
was apparently the only protection the southerners deemed necessary.
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terests of the nation, was distinguished from the proposed secretary of
domestic affairs, who was to oversee the internal interests.32 Clearly,
commerce was distinct from domestic affairs and the commerce clause
was not perceived to be a broad grant of domestic power.
Interpreting the Constitution in light of the problems it was in-
tended to solve, as James Madison urged, 3 additionally supports the
conclusion that the interstate commerce power was meant to be only a
slight grant of domestic power. One of these problems was the economic
Balkanization of the states: the states taxed imports from sister states
in order to assist local businesses or to retaliate for levies placed on
their exports.34 Based on the available evidence, and lack thereof, the
commerce clause apparently was a remedial measure that removed
power from the states and empowered Congress to prevent obstructive,
competitive state legislation. 5 The interstate commerce power, then,
merely was incidental to the foreign commerce power.
For the first century of the country's existence, Congress rarely jus-
tified federal legislation as an exercise of the commerce clause;s" it was
invoked more frequently by the Supreme Court to strike down state
statutes deemed discriminatory." Just before the turn of the century,
however, the federal government began an aggressive use of the com-
merce power to support far-reaching legislation. Since that early period
the interstate commerce power has shed its anonymity and become a
source of tremendous federal power.3 s
B. Congressional Regulation for the Public Welfare
The leading case during the early era of Supreme Court interpreta-
tion of federal legislation enacted under the commerce power was
Champion v. Ames. 9 The appellant in Champion had been indicted for
32. Abel, supra note 22, at 467.
33. Letter from James Madison to Professor Davis (1832), reprinted in 3 M. FARRAND, THE
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 520-21 (1911).
34. Abel, supra note 22, at 471; Cushman, The National Police Power Under the Commerce
Clause of the Constitution (pt. 3), 3 MINN. L. REV. 452, 459 (1919); James Madison: Preface to
Debates in the Convention of 1787, reprinted in 3 M. FARRAND, supra note 33, at 547-48.
35. E. PRENTICE & J. EGAN, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 2 (1898);
Abel, supra note 22, at 471; Cirillo & Eisenhofer, supra note 9, at 905; Letter from James Madison
to J.C. Cabell (Feb. 13, 1829), reprinted in 3 M. FARRAND, supra note 33, at 478.
36. In 1898, however, according to at least two observers, the commerce clause had already
become "perhaps the most important and conspicuous power possessed by the Federal govern-
ment." E. PRENTICE & J. EGAN, supra note 35, at 1.
37. This seems to lend credibility to the conclusion that the commerce power was negative
and not affirmative.
38. For extended citation of statutes passed under the commerce power, see Friendly, Feder-
alism: A Foreword, 86 YALE L.J. 1018, 1021-27 (1977).
39. (The Lottery Case), 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
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the interstate transportation of lottery tickets in violation of the Lot-
tery Act.40 The Court offered two rationales for the Lottery Act's con-
stitutionality. First, regardless of its motives for doing so, Congress may
regulate any article being transported interstate.41 The commerce clause
delegates complete control to the federal government over the facilities
of interstate commerce. This federal control directly parallels the indi-
vidual states' control over internal commerce. Therefore, whatever
states may do regarding conduct within their territory, Congress may
do with regard to interstate commerce. Because a state may regulate
the internal sale and transportation of lottery tickets, Congress may
regulate the interstate counterpart to those activities. 2
The second rationale for the Champion decision was broader than
the first. The Court reasoned that Congress must have the power to
protect public morals and health in situations in which the states can-
not. The Lottery Act merely was a congressional attempt to supplement
and strengthen the states' policy against lotteries.43 Moreover, Congress
was the only power competent to do so.44 Recognizing the broad impli-
cations of its ruling, the Court carefully limited its holding to the facts
of the case' 5 and invoked the political process as an independent check
on Congress.'6
In Champion Justice Harlan, writing for the majority, declared
that Congress has broad discretion in the exercise of its commerce
power and vowed not to impose the Court's opinion as to the effective-
ness of the means adopted. 7 Nevertheless, the depth of Justice
Harlan's disapproval of lotteries is amply illustrated by the dramatic
40. The Act prohibited the interstate transportation, via United States mail or other means,
of lottery tickets or the equivalent. Id. at 322. The appellant was arrested for transporting tickets,
by private carrier, from Dallas, Texas to Fresno, California. He was jailed upon his refusal to post
bond. He thereupon petitioned the District Court for the Northern District of Texas for a writ of
habeas corpus. Id. at 323-25.
41. Id. at 354. According to the Court, "regulation" included complete prohibition. Id. at 362.
42. Id. at 357 (stating that "[a]s a state may, for the purpose of guarding the morals of its
own people, forbid all sales of lottery tickets within its limits, so Congress, for the purpose of
guarding the people of the United States against the 'widespread pestilence of lotteries'. .. , may
prohibit the carrying of lottery tickets from one State to another").
43. Id.
44. Id. at 358 (reasoning that interstate transportation of lottery tickets can be "met and
crushed by the only power [Congress] competent to that end").
45. Id. at 363 (holding that "[tihe whole subject is too important. . . to justify any attempt
to lay down a rule for determining in advance the validity of every statute that may be enacted
under the commerce clause").
46. Justice Harlan explained that, if Congress exceeded the scope of the powers granted to it,
the courts had the duty to invalidate the statute. However, if Congress acted within its power but
the action was "unwise or injurious," the political process would take over. Id. (citing Gibbons v.
Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824)).
47. Id. at 353.
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language he used in his opinion."' One cannot help but think that the
Champion Court was judging lotteries and not the Lottery Act.
Writing for the four dissenters, Chief Justice Fuller similarly ad-
mitted distaste for lotteries. Yet, notwithstanding his own feelings,
Chief Justice Fuller found the statute beyond the scope of the com-
merce power because it was based on Congress' determination that
gambling on lotteries was detrimental to the public morals.49 The pro-
tection of public health and morality, Chief Justice Fuller argued, is
properly reserved to the states.8 Congressional intent to aid the states
in their endeavor to suppress lotteries was irrelevant because the scope
of the commerce clause does not depend on current views of public
interest."1
The Court's tolerance of early congressional commerce regulation is
illustrated further by Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States.52 The Pure
Food and Drug Act (PFDA), under which the Egg Company's property
had been confiscated, prohibited the interstate transportation of arti-
cles failing to meet federal standards of safety or purity." After Cham-
pion, the success of the Egg Company's challenge to the PFDA
depended on the rebuttal of the Court's interpretation that Congress
may regulate any article being transported interstate. Thus, the Com-
pany was forced to argue that federal jurisdiction did not extend to
goods shipped interstate after the goods had reached their destination
and had been mingled with local property. 4 That is, Congress could act
only on articles in transit, and the Egg Company's property had come
to rest prior to seizure 55 The Court did not agree to such a limitation.
Instead it held that articles illicitly transported interstate may be con-
fiscated wherever they are found. 6
As in Champion, the Hipolite Court based its decision on the the-
48. For example, Justice Harlan stated that lotteries were an "evil of. . . appalling charac-
ter," and "offensive to the entire people of the Nation." Id. at 357-58.
49. Id. at 364 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting) (noting that the express purpose of the statute was
the suppression of lotteries and its validity must be tested against that purpose).
50. Id. at 364-65.
51. Id. at 372.
52. 220 U.S. 45 (1911).
53. Pure Food and Drug Act of June 30, 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-394, ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768
(1907); Hipolite Egg Co., 220 U.S. at 50-51. The Egg Company conceded that the eggs it had
shipped interstate were adulterated within the meaning of the Act. Id. at 51-52.
54. The Egg Company actually raised three challenges: (1) the Act did not apply to products
shipped for use as raw materials in the manufacture of other products; (2) the district court did
not have in personam jurisdiction; and (3) the district court had no in rem jurisdiction over the
eggs since Congress did not have power to enact a statute granting such jurisdiction. Id. at 52. The
first two arguments are not considered here since they raised questions of statutory construction.
Only the third argument implicated the commerce power.
55. Id. at 55.
56. Id. at 58.
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ory that Congress may regulate anything transported interstate. In
addition, after examining Congress' reasons for enacting the PFDA5 8
the Court offered a second justification. The Hipolite Court recognized
that while Congress was hoping to eliminate commerce in adulterated
articles, the statute also was an attempt to assure American consumers
that articles manufactured in this country, regardless of the state from
which they originated, would be pure and safe.59 The congressional pur-
pose was to protect public health and facilitate interstate trade in food
and prescription drugs.
Hoke v. United States60 is another case exemplifying Congress'
early success at enacting legislation to protect the public. In that case
the White Slave Act was challenged by the defendants who had been
convicted of transporting women and girls from Louisiana to Texas for
the purpose of prostitution."' The Court again relied on the theory that
anything, including people, transported interstate is per se within the
reach of the commerce power.2 The Court held that Congress had the
power to take the facility of interstate commerce away from any
activity. 3
In Hoke the Court further recognized a congressional power to reg-
ulate for the general welfare of the people. According to the Court, both
the states and Congress are empowered to act, whether independently
or concurrently, to promote the material and moral welfare of the na-
tion."' In conjunction with federal power to regulate for the general wel-
fare, the Court declared limits on its own power. The Court adopted a
policy of judicial abstention from the examination of Congress' purpose
for enacting legislation. Using the PFDA as an example, the Court
demonstrated the new policy. While Congress could not prohibit either
the manufacture of adulterated products or the sale of such products
within a state, Congress could accomplish the same end by prohibiting
57. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
58. The purpose of the Act was not merely to prevent interstate movement of adulterated
articles, but to prevent the use of them. Hipolite Egg Co., 220 U.S. at 55.
59. Id. (reasoning that "[i]t is certainly to the interest of a . . . consumer that the article
which he receives, no matter whence it come, shall be pure, and the law seeks to secure that
interest").
60. 227 U.S. 308 (1913).
61. Id. at 317.
62. Id. at 323 (stating that "Congress has power over transportation 'among the several
States' [and] the power is complete in itself").
63. Id. at 322.
64. Id. The defendants asserted that the Act was an interference with state sovereignty. The
states have power to prohibit prostitution; therefore, Congress must not have the same power. The
Court responded that Congress alone has power over prostitution beyond the jurisdiction of the
states-that is, interstate prostitution. Id. at 321-22.
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interstate commerce in adulterated products. 5
C. Regulation of the National Economy
Despite the fact that the Court had permitted Congress to use the
commerce power to regulate for the protection of public health and mo-
rality, the Court strongly resisted economic regulation during the same
period. Then, after nullifying several New Deal efforts,6 and perhaps in
fear of President Franklin Roosevelt's "court-packing" plan,67 the Court
reversed its course and began sustaining congressional use of the com-
merce power to regulate the national economy. In the course of five
years, the Court completely reinterpreted the commerce clause to allow
broad economic regulation.
The first case to reinterpret the commerce clause to allow economic
regulation was NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,"' in which the
Court sustained the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). The Jones
& Laughlin Steel Corporation (Jones & Laughlin) was a fully integrated
enterprise owning assets and operating facilities throughout the coun-
try. In fact, Jones & Laughlin was the fourth largest manufacturer of
steel and iron in the United States. 9 The Court placed great weight on
the unique aspects of the case, noting that Jones & Laughlin had pur-
posely organized itself to take advantage of interstate commerce."0 After
expressly reserving the right to test the constitutionality of the statute
in future cases, 7 1 the Court concluded that the NLRA was constitu-
65. Id. at 322. The Court, by this example, illustrated that Congress' motive or objection was
irrelevant.
66. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (nullifying the Bituminous Coal
Conservation Act of 1935 (Guffey Coal Act) on the grounds that the connection to interstate com-
merce was too indirect); Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (striking
down the National Industrial Recovery Act's wage and hour standards on similar grounds); Rail-
road Retirement Bd. v. Alton R.R. Co., 295 U.S. 330 (1935) (nullifying the Railroad Retirement
Act of 1934 because the mandatory retirement and pension plan was not a regulation of com-
merce). See generally Stern, supra note 21.
67. President Roosevelt's plan would have permitted an incumbent president to appoint a
new Supreme Court justice for every current justice over the age of 70.
68. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
69. Id. at 26. For a detailed discussion of the corporation's activities throughout the country,
see id. at 25-28.
70. Id. at 41. The Court rhetorically asked:
When industries organize themselves on a national scale, making their relation to interstate
commerce the dominant factor in their activities, how can it be maintained that their indus-
trial labor relations constitute a forbidden field into which Congress may not enter when it is
necessary to protect interstate commerce from the paralyzing consequences of industrial war?
Id.
71. Id. at 32. The Court devised a saving interpretation for the NLRA by which it could be
constitutionally applied only when the regulated industry has a close and intimate effect on inter-
state commerce. Id.
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tional as applied to Jones & Laughlin." Thus, the National Labor Rela-
tion Board's orders regarding management practices at the Jones &
Laughlin's Aliquippa, Pennsylvania plant were enforceable.7 3
In reaching its conclusion, the Court declared that the commerce
clause gave Congress the power to protect interstate commerce from
burdens and obstructions whenever they might arise.74 The commerce
power, therefore, can support congressional control over intrastate ac-
tivities if the purpose is to protect and facilitate interstate commerce.
In this case federal intervention was proper because the stoppage of
Jones & Laughlin's activities due to labor unrest would have had an
immediate and perhaps catastrophic effect on interstate commerce.6
However, the Court was careful to warn that some intrastate activity
would be so remote from interstate commerce that congressional regula-
tion would obliterate the distinction between national and local con-
cerns and would result in a completely centralized government.
77
Soon after Jones & Laughlin the Court sustained the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA). 8 The FLSA prohibited the manufac-
ture and interstate transportation of goods produced under substan-
dard working conditions. In United States v. Darby"9 the owners of a
lumber factory in Georgia had been charged with failure to comply with
the wage, hour, and record-keeping requirements of the FLSA.5 ° After
overruling a prior case, which struck down a nearly identical statute,81
the Supreme Court held all aspects of the FLSA to be properly within
72. Id. at 43.
73. The Board ordered Jones & Laughlin to cease and desist discrimination against union
employees, to offer reinstatement and back-pay to employees discharged because of their union
activities, and to post notices that it would comply with the NLRA standards. Id. at 22.
74. Id. at 36. The Court rejected the restrictive interpretations that had been fatal to previ-
ous commerce regulations: the indirect-direct distinction, see Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238; the
stream of commerce requirement, see Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495 (1922); and the theory that
manufacturing and production were not commerce, see Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
75. In Jones & Laughlin the Court declared:
[C]ongressional ... power is plenary and may be exerted to protect interstate commerce "no
matter what the source of the dangers which threaten it". . . . Although activities may be
intrastate. . ., if they have such a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce that
their control is essential or appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens and obstruc-
tions, Congress cannot be denied the power to exercise that control.
301 U.S. at 36-37 (citations omitted).
76. Id. at 41.
77. Id. at 37.
78. Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 201 (1982)).
79. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
80. Id. at 111. Georgia and other states to which appellee's goods were shipped had chosen
not to set labor standards. Id. at 112-14.
81. The Court overruled Hammer, 247 U.S. 251, which held that Congress could not establish
child labor laws. Darby, 312 U.S. at 117.
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the scope of the commerce power. s2
In Darby the Court offered two independent justifications for sus-
taining the FLSA. First, the Court reiterated the familiar doctrine that
Congress may regulate any article which is transported interstate and
may exercise that power by choosing any means reasonably adapted to
achieving that end.83 Complete prohibition of production under sub-
standard working conditions was a means reasonably adapted to keep-
ing articles produced under substandard conditions out of interstate
commerce. 84 The Court apparently held that Congress could prohibit a
purely local activity on the grounds that it would be inconvenient to
devise a less intrusive statute. The Court did state as a means of defini-
tion that Congress had the discretionary power to regulate interstate
commerce for the protection of public health and morality even where a
state had not seen fit to acknowledge a threat.85 Despite this expansive
language, the breadth of Darby's first holding has been cited as perhaps
unintended.8 6
The second justification for Darby was that the manufacture of
goods under nonconforming conditions was detrimental to the inter-
state commerce of goods manufactured under better conditions.8 " Non-
conforming goods are less expensive to produce and may be sold well
below the price of similar products. The government argued that no
state could establish humane working conditions without jeopardizing
local industry. 8 Relying on Jones & Laughlin, the Court concluded
that the FLSA regulated activities that had a substantial effect on in-
terstate commerce and, therefore, was constitutional.8 9
In Wickard v. Filburn90 the Court sustained the Agriculture Ad-
justment Act of 1938 (AAA)9' in an opinion that gave a broad interpre-
tation to the commerce clause. At issue was Filburn's refusal to pay a
82. Darby, 312 U.S. at 115.
83. Id. at 121.
84. Id. at 118. The Court noted that "it would be practically impossible ... to restrict the
prohibited kind of production to the particular [articles] which later move in interstate rather than
intrastate commerce." Id.
85. Id. at 114.
86. G. GUNTHER, supra note 20, at 143-44.
87. Darby, 312 U.S. at 122 (reasoning that "[tihe Act is thus directed at the suppression of a
method or kind of competition in interstate commerce which it has in effect condemned as
'unfair' 
").
88. See infra notes 201-06 and accompanying text.
89. Darby, 312 U.S. at 119.
90. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
91. Pub. L. No. 75-430, ch. 30, 52 Stat. 31 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 1281 (1982)).
The AAA authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to allot each wheat farmer a quota limiting the
acreage he could sow. The quota did not distinguish between acres intended to yield home-con-
sumed wheat and those yielding wheat for sale. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 114.
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penalty for harvesting and using wheat in excess of his federal quota
under the AAA. 2 Filburn asserted that the AAA was beyond the scope
of the commerce clause because, as applied to him, it regulated a purely
local activity with only a remote and indirect effect on interstate com-
merce." The Court disposed of Filburn's argument by reaffirming the
holdings of Darby and Jones & Laughlin: Congress may regulate any
activity having a substantial effect on interstate commerce.9 4 In this
case there was sufficient evidence for Congress to conclude that home-
consumed wheat substantially influenced price and market conditions
by competing with wheat in commerce.9 5
Thus, after 1945, the Court had provided Congress with two broad
commerce clause interpretations. First, based on the holdings of Cham-
pion, Hipolite, and Hoke, Congress could regulate any article being
transported interstate. Second, based on Jones & Laughlin, Darby, and
Wickard, Congress could regulate any activity that had a substantial
effect on interstate commerce or the national economy. The only limita-
tion was that the means employed must be reasonably related to the
congressional objective.
D. Regulation for Local Welfare
Nearly a century after the first Civil Rights Act was struck down as
unconstitutional," the federal government responded to the still perva-
sive existence of racial discrimination by enacting the Civil Rights Act
of 1964. The 1964 Act was an attempt to eliminate both state-sponsored
and private discrimination against minorities.9 Rather than rely on the
92. Filburn sowed excess acreage and harvested 239 bushels of wheat from that acreage. The
AAA required him to pay a penalty or store the excess wheat. Id. at 114-15. Rather than abide by
the AAA, Filburn filed suit to enjoin enforcement of the penalty and for a declaratory judgment
that the AAA was unconstitutional as applied to him. Id. at 113. Filburn relied on precedent which
indicated that Congress did not have the power to regulate activities with only an indirect connec-
tion to interstate commerce. See supra note 74. Similar language was employed in Jones & Laugh-
lin to limit the holding of that case. See supra note 75. In Wickard the distinction between direct
and indirect economic effects was discarded in favor of the "substantial effect on interstate com-
merce" standard. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125.
93. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 119. The Court admitted that Filburn's wheat was trivial by itself
but the aggregate effect of home-consumed wheat was "far from trivial." Id. at 127-28.
94. Id. at 125.
95. Id. at 128-29.
96. In The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), the Court struck down the Civil Rights Act
of 1875. That Act sought to secure to all people in the United States equal access to facilities open
to the public. The Court held that neither the thirteenth nor the fourteenth amendment empow-
ered Congress to reach anything but state action. Id. at 23.
97. The stated purpose of the Act was "to promote the general welfare by eliminating dis-
crimination based on race, color, religion, or national origin in ... public accommodations through
the exercise by Congress of the powers conferred upon it ... to regulate commerce among the
several States . . . ." Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 245 (1964) (quoting
19881 1031
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:1019
as-yet undeveloped power of the thirteenth and fourteenth amend-
ments to the Constitution, s Congress, at the urging of Attorney Gen-
eral Robert Kennedy, linked the legislation to the commerce clause.99
In Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States,100 Katzenbach v. Mc-
Clung,'0' and Daniel v. Paul,0 2 the Court held that every aspect of the
Civil Rights Act was within congressional commerce power. In Heart of
Atlanta Motel the appellant operated a large motel serving interstate
travelers on major highways intersecting in Atlanta. 0 3 Given the clien-
tele of the motel, it was easy for the government to show that interstate
commerce was affected by the motel's discriminatory policies.' 0 ' In the
other two cases, however, the establishments guilty of discrimination
had no direct connection with interstate travelers. 10 5 Nevertheless, the
Court agreed with the government's contention that discrimination cre-
ated artificial barriers to interstate commerce. A specific showing that a
restaurant or recreational park catered to interstate customers or other-
wise utilized interstate commerce was not necessary. The aggregate ac-
tivity substantially affected interstate commerce and, therefore, was
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (approved July 2, 1964)).
98. See infra notes 215-25 and accompanying text.
99. See A Bill to Eliminate Discrimination in Public Accommodations Affecting Interstate
Commerce: Hearings on S. 1732 Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 163
(1964) (statement of the Hon. Robert F. Kennedy, Attorney General of the United States).
100. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
101. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
102. 395 U.S. 298 (1969).
103. The appellant actively solicited patronage from out-of-state residents through the use of
national advertising media. The motel refused to rent rooms to blacks, and instituted suit against
the United States seeking a declaration that the discrimination could continue. The appellant also
sought an injunction against enforcement of the Civil Rights Act. Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S.
at 243-44.
104. Id. at 253 (stating: "We shall not burden this opinion with further details since the
voluminous testimony [before Congress] presents overwhelming evidence that discrimination by
hotels and motels impedes interstate travel"); see also id. at 270-71 (Black, J., concurring) (stating
that "[i]t requires no novel or strained interpretation of the Commerce Clause to sustain [the Civil
Rights Act] as applied in either of these cases").
105. In Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964), the appellees instituted a suit similar to
the one in Heart of Atlanta Motel. See supra note 103. McClung owned a restaurant in Birming-
ham, Alabama which catered to a local clientele. The policy of Ollie's Barbecue was to serve blacks
only through take-out service. The evidence presented indicated that the restaurant used a sub-
stantial quantity of meat procured by a local supplier from out-of-state sources. Katzenbach, 379
U.S. at 296. The Court held that Congress reasonably could have concluded that local discrimina-
tion created an artificial barrier to interstate commerce by restricting interstate travel by blacks
and generally depressing the business climate. Id. at 300.
In Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969), blacks refused admission to a recreation facility near
Little Rock, Arkansas brought a class action to enjoin the owners from excluding them. Id. at 300-
01. The Court held that, by virtue of the fact that the facility sold food that had been shipped
interstate, leased paddleboats from an Oklahoma company, and owned a jukebox manufactured
out-of-state, the operations of the facility affected interstate commerce. Id. at 308.
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within Congress' power to regulate. 10 6
In addition to its attempt to eliminate local discrimination, Con-
gress also has used its commerce power to bring certain local crimes
within the jurisdiction of federal law enforcement agencies. The stat-
utes involved often criminalize activity already proscribed at the state
level. 10 7 The leading case in the federal criminal area is Perez v. United
States. 03 Perez was convicted under Title II of the Consumer Credit
Protection Act for engaging in loan shark activity. His petition chal-
lenged congressional authority to classify his purely intrastate activity
as a federal offense. 09 After examining the evidence gleaned from the
legislative history, the Court concluded that there was a rational basis
for the congressional finding that loan sharking had a substantial effect
on interstate commerce." 0 As to Perez' purely intrastate loan sharking,
the Court held that in regulating a class of activities, Congress should
consider the aggregate effect on interstate commerce."' Even when an
individual instance cannot be shown to have an interstate effect, the
Court will not consider that activity beyond the reach of Congress if,
when taken in the aggregate, that activity may be viewed as affecting
interstate commerce. The Consumer Credit Protection Act, therefore,
was constitutional as applied to anyone engaged in the prohibited
activity.112
In dissent to Perez, Justice Stewart pointed out that all criminal
activity, when aggregated, affects interstate commerce. Nothing about
loan sharking distinguished it from other local crimes." 3 On the
grounds that the Framers did not intend the commerce clause to em-
power the national government to enact federal criminal laws over
purely local matters," 4 Justice Stewart concluded that the ninth and
tenth amendments reserved the definition and prosecution of local
106. Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 300-01 (quoting Wickard, 317 U.S. at 127-28 (1942)).
107. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (1982 & Supp. 1988) (criminalizing kidnapping when the
victim is transported interstate); 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1982) (making certain state crimes federal of-
fenses when interstate commerce is affected); 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (1982 & Supp. 1988) (criminalizing
bank robbery); 21 U.S.C. §§ 841-852 (1982 & Supp. 1988) (criminalizing the manufacture, distribu-
tion or possession of certain drugs). See generally Stern, The Commerce Clause Revisited-The
Federalization of Intrastate Crime, 15 Amiz. L. REv. 271 (1973).
108. 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
109. Id. at 146-49, 156-57.
110. The legislative history tended to show that Congress based the Consumer Credit Protec-
tion Act on evidence that loan sharking was a major source of income for national organized crime
and was used to gain control of legitimate businesses. Id. at 156-57.
111. Id. at 154.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 157 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
114. Id.
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crime to the states."' According to Justice Stewart, the statute at issue
was unconstitutional as applied to Perez because there was no showing
that he was ever involved in interstate activity or that his conduct af-
fected interstate commerce." 6
Recent cases have formalized a two-part test for determining the
constitutionality of federal regulation enacted as an exercise of the com-
merce power. The test is grounded in the interpretation that the com-
merce clause is a grant of plenary authority to Congress extending to
activities affecting interstate commerce. "1 When Congress determines
that an activity affects interstate commerce, the only limitation on its
regulatory power is that there be a rational basis for that finding." The
court then inquires whether the means are reasonably adapted to the
permitted end."" Civil rights and criminal cases show that Congress
may regulate acts with no independent effect on interstate commerce,
but which are part of a class that, as a whole, could be said to have such
an effect.120 As a practical matter, the rational basis test, in combina-
tion with the aggregate effect principle, brings all activities within the
scope of the commerce power. 2 '
E. The National League of Cities Experiment
In 1976 the Supreme Court added another restriction to the two-
part rational basis test. In National League of Cities v. Usery12 2 the
Court adopted the position that the tenth amendment operated as an
independent bar to congressional regulation of states and their political
subdivisions.' 2 3 At issue in National League of Cities was a 1974
amendment to the FLSA2 which required state governments to com-
115. Id. at 158.
116. Id. at 157.
117. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 276-77 (1981).
118. Id. at 276.
119. Id.
120. See Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 (1975); Stem, supra note 107, at 274; cf. L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 310 (1978).
121. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 584 (1985) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (pointing out that "virtually every activity of a private individual, arguably 'affects'
interstate commerce"); Light, The Federal Commerce Power, 49 VA. L. REv. 717, 728 (1963) (stat-
ing that "[iun the light of Wickard v. Filburn it is difficult to discern a meaningful limit to the
[commerce] power, which now, as the Court asserted in 1946, 'is as broad as the economic needs of
the nation' "); see also M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 41 (1982)
(stating that the delegated powers are "quite indeterminate in scope").
122. 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S.
528 (1985).
123. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 845.
124. The Supreme Court found the FLSA within the commerce power in United States v.
Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). For a discussion of Darby, see supra notes 79-89 and accompanying
text.
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ply with the labor standards of that Act. After examining the potential
effect on the states,125 the Court concluded that application of the
FLSA to state employees would unjustifiably interfere with the "inte-
gral governmental functions" of the states.128 The Court held that the
amendment, insofar as it regulated the states as states and displaced
the states' freedom to structure traditional governmental operations,"2
was beyond the scope of Congress' commerce power.1 28
After nearly ten years of struggling to define "traditional govern-
mental functions," however, the Court abandoned the effort as "un-
workable" in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.29
The Garcia Court held that the principles of National League of Cities
were inconsistent with federalism and had no constitutional basis.130 As
an illustration, the Court noted that the Constitution and the Bill of
125. For a discussion of the increased cost to the states, both monetary and indirect, see
National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 846-51.
126. Id. at 851. In Hodel the Court formalized the test as follows:
[I]n order to succeed, a claim that congressional commerce power legislation is invalid under
the reasoning of National League of Cities must satisfy each of three requirements. First,
there must be a showing that the challenged statute regulates the "States as States." Second,
the federal regulation must address matters that are indisputably "attribute[s] of state sover-
eignty." And third, it must be apparent that the States' compliance with the federal law
would directly impair their ability "to structure integral operations in areas of traditional
governmental functions."
Hodel, 452 U.S. at 287-88 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). Additionally, the Hodel Court
stated that "[d]emonstrating that these three requirements are met does not. . . guarantee [suc-
cess]. There are situations in which the nature of the federal interest advanced may be such that it
justifies state submission." Id. at 288 n.29.
127. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 852.
128. National League of Cities received extended consideration by commentators. See, e.g.,
Bogen, Usery Limits on National Interest, 22 Aruz. L. REv. 753 (1980); Choper, The Scope of
National Power Vis-&-Vis the States: The Dispensability of Judicial Review, 86 YALE L.J. 1552
(1977); Matsumoto, National League of Cities-From Footnote to Holding: State Immunity from
Commerce Clause Regulation, 1977 ARIz. ST. L.J. 35; Michelman, States' Rights and States' Roles:
Permutations of "Sovereignty" in National League of Cities v. Usery, 86 YALE L.J. 1165 (1977);
Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities: The New Federalism and Affirmative Rights to Es-
sential Government Services, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1065 (1977).
129. 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (overruling National League of Cities, 426 U.S. 833). Garcia re-
ceived much attention from commentators. See, e.g., Baird, State Empowerment After Garcia, 18
URB. LAW. 491 (1986); Field, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority: The Demise of
a Misguided Doctrine, 99 HARv. L. REv. 84 (1985); Howard, Garcia and the Values of Federalism:
On the Need for a Recurrence to Fundamental Principles, 19 GA. L. REv. 789 (1985); La Pierre,
Political Accountability in the National Political Process-The Alternative to Judicial Review of
Federalism Issues, 80 Nw. UL. REv. 577 (1985); Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The
Jurisprudence of Federalism After Garcia, 1985 Sup. CT. REv. 341; Tushnet, Federalism and the
Traditions of American Political Theory, 19 GA. L. REV. 981 (1985); Van Alstyne, The Second
Death of Federalism, 83 MIcH. L. REv. 1709 (1985).
130. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 531. The Court also warned that state immunity from federal regula-
tion based on a judicial determination of traditional or integral functions would stifle state legisla-
tive experimentation and evolution of policy because innovation might compromise
intergovernmental immunity. Id. at 546-47.
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Rights are replete with limitations of, and infringements on, state sov-
ereignty.' Moreover, the Court continued, the structure of the federal
government, inasmuch as each state is represented in Congress, assures
that state interests will be protected."3 2 Thus, the principal and basic
limitations on the federal commerce power, according to the Garcia
Court, are the built-in restraints that safeguard federalism in the politi-
cal process itself.'33
Garcia departed from traditional constitutional interpretation
when it declared the political system a primary restraint on federal
power. 3 4 The structure of the Constitution indicates that the Framers
believed that the political branches were incapable of restraining them-
selves.' Section eight of article one expressly lists the powers dele-
gated to the national legislature; section nine expressly lists powers that
may not be exercised.'36 If the Framers thought Congress competent to
monitor itself, then express boundaries would not have been neces-
sary. 37 By opting to enumerate specifically the powers of the federal
legislature, the Framers provided absolute limits on congressional
power-limits that could not be changed by the political process except
through amendment. 38
In Garcia Justice Blackmun argued that the political process was a
built-in restraint on Congress, 3 9 but nowhere in the Constitution was
the power of the people invoked to restrict the exercise of congressional
131. Id. at 548-49 (citing article I, §§ 8 & 10 and the incorporation of the Bill of Rights into
the fourteenth amendment).
132. Id. at 551.
133. Id. at 556.
134. Since the time of Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137 (1803), it has been the
role of the Supreme Court to interpret the Constitution. By relinquishing that role, even in the
"narrow" case of commerce clause jurisprudence, the Court compromises the integrity of the
counter-majoritarian principles of judicial review. See Redish & Drizin, Constitutional Federalism
and Judicial Review: The Role of Textual Analysis, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 16-17 (1987).
135. This is not to say that the Framers did not believe in majority rule:
[T]he framers believed in democratic principles, they feared any unchecked power-even
power lodged in the majority. Consequently, in order to limit the majority's power, the fram-
ers established a constitutional form of democracy. Through a written Constitution, subject
to stringent amendment procedures, they limited certain governmental action, thereby pro-
tecting important values, principles, and rights from majority control.
Redish & Drizin, supra note 134, at 15 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original).
136. See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 8 & 9.
137. Redish & Drizin, supra note 134, at 13. The Redish and Drizin article noted:
Article I, section 8 contains eighteen clauses, each bestowing a discrete power on the national
government .... This checklist structure necessarily implies a limitation on congressional
authority. Had the drafters not intended that the powers of the federal government be lim-
ited, enumerating specific powers would have been a pointless exercise.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
138. See U.S. CONST. art. V.
139. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 556.
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power. Instead, the built-in restraint is the constitutional separation of
powers. 140 Since the time of Marbury v. Madison,14 ' the role of the Su-
preme Court has been to measure congressional action against the yard-
stick of the Constitution. Garcia goes against nearly two hundred years
of constitutional jurisprudence by adopting a policy that allows federal
officials to be the sole judges of the limitations of their own power.'42
Thus, while the political process may serve to defeat federal legislation
that is unwise, the Supreme Court is obliged to invalidate legislation
that exceeds the boundaries defined in the Constitution.43
In the three dissenting opinions to Garcia,4 each dissenter ex-
pressed the hope that the traditional state function doctrine would be
revived in the near future. 45 National League of Cities, however, only
protected states by interpreting the tenth amendment to be an inde-
pendent restraint on congressional regulation of state governments. 146
Because National League of Cities did not adjust the rational basis test
as applied to commerce regulation generally, it did not address the
140. See O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 530 (1933) (reasoning that "[tihe Con-
stitution, in distributing the powers of government, creates three distinct and separate depart-
ments . . . [and] [i]ts object is basic and vital, . . . namely, to preclude a commingling of these
essentially different powers of government in the same hands" (citation omitted)); Myers v. United
States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (pointing out that "[tihe purpose [of
separation of powers] was, not to avoid friction, but, by means of the inevitable friction incident to
the distributions of the governmental powers among three departments, to save the people from
autocracy"); Rapaczynski, supra note 128, at 374 (noting that "to guarantee that . . . 'tyranny'
would not ensue . ., supraindividual (institutional) bodies were created to watch over each other
to forestall the rise of an oppressive government"); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (J. Madison).
141. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137 (1803).
142. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 567 (Powell, J., dissenting).
143. See Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Cen-
tury, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 17 (1988) (positing that "[Garcia] errs because it assumes that mere
political consensus may override constitutional provisions designed to check the concentration of
governmental power").
144. Justice Powell wrote a dissent in which Chief Justice Burger, Justice Rehnquist, and
Justice O'Connor joined. Justice Rehnquist dissented in a separate opinion. Justice O'Connor also
dissented separately in an opinion joined by Justices Powell and Rehnquist.
145. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 580 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (stating "I am confident [that
the principles of National League of Cities will] in time again command the support of a majority
of this Court"); see also id. at 589 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (predicting that "this Court will in
time again assume its constitutional responsibility").
146. Even in this narrow field, National League of Cities was the only instance that the
"traditional state functions" test was invoked to invalidate federal legislation. In the nine years
between National League of Cities and Garcia, the Court faced four cases requiring interpretation
of that test and never found the criteria met. EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983) (finding no
state government immunity from the Age Discrimination Act); Federal Energy Regulatory
Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982) (holding no immunity for state public utilities from
federal energy regulations); United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 455 U.S. 678 (1982) (hold-
ing no immunity for state commuter railroads from the Railway Labor Act); Hodel v. Virginia
Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981) (holding that federal surface mining
regulations did not infringe state sovereignty).
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broader issue of the displacement of state regulation of individual con-
duct by federal legislation.147
Garcia, in contrast to the narrow holding of National League of
Cities, may be read as the Supreme Court's admission that it was una-
ble to define any limits on congressional commerce power whether exer-
cised to regulate states or individuals.14 8 Perhaps the fundamental issue
after Garcia, then, is whether it is desirable for the judiciary to restrict
federal power. In other words, should the political process be the only
restriction on Congress because the country has changed so much over
the past two hundred years that constitutional limitations are no longer
relevant? In order to answer this question, Part III considers the role of
the states in the federal system and the advantages of state regulation
of the individual.
III. THE VIRTUES OF STATE REGULATION
Some commentators have suggested that as long as one government
(state, local, or federal) has the power to regulate an activity, it is im-
material which government actually regulates. In fact, some commenta-
tors have said that allowing the federal government to impose the same
kinds of regulation which the states have been able to impose will have
no effect on individual freedom. 49 Therefore, only the states-not indi-
viduals or the Supreme Court-need be concerned about federal en-
croachment. Individual rights, however, are affected when the federal
government usurps traditional state authority over private conduct.
The Framers of the Constitution intended to create an indivisible
Union, composed of indestructible states,150 by balancing the strengths
147. Rapaczynski, supra note 129, at 362 (stating that "the [National League of Cities] deci-
sion did not protect the states as governmental institutions in the sense . . .of assuring their
ability to impose the ultimate rules of conduct in any given area of extragovernmental activities").
One commentator stated that:
[N]o doctrine that protects the states only from direct regulation by the federal government
...could go far in redressing the basic shift in power [from states to federal government].
...As long as the federal government is free to regulate the states' citizens and corporations
whenever it operates within its broad delegated powers, the very goals [of National League of
Cities] cannot be achieved.
Field, supra note 129, at 103 (footnotes omitted).
148. See Redish & Drizin, supra note 134, at 9 (observing that "[a]s a practical matter. . . it
appears clear after Garcia that the Court will abstain from enforcing limits on the commerce
power inherent in the structure of article I").
149. See Alfange, Congressional Power and Constitutional Limitations, 18 J. PUB. L. 103,
121 (1969); see also J. CHOPER, JuDmcuL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 196 (1980)
(noting that "[i]f the states concededly may do to the individual what it is claimed that the federal
government may not do, the issue of concern is primarily one for the states and ...may be
entrusted to the states' representatives in the national political branches to decide").
150. Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 725 (1869). See Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7
Wall.) 71 (1869). The Court in Lane County wrote: "[In many articles of the Constitution the
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of state governance with the need for federal regulation of some activi-
ties.151 When Congress displaces local authority, individuals lose the
benefits of being governed by the states. This section discusses some of
those benefits.
A. Ability to Provide for Local Diversity
A diversity of attitudes, values, and resources exists in the United
States despite the integration of the national economy and the techno-
logical advances that blur state boundaries. 151 Yet, when Congress regu-
lates, because it must legislate for the nation as a whole, no allowance
can be made for these variations. 53 As the Anti-Federalists recognized,
in a large nation many important regional differences must be ignored
for the sake of uniform administration.1 5 4 When the federal government
does not act, state and local governments can adjust for local
diversity. 155
The Supreme Court, in negative commerce clause cases, 5 6 has rec-
ognized the value of state regulation as a reflection of varying condi-
tions. For example, in South Carolina State Highway Department v.
Barnwell Bros., Inc.,1 57 the respondent sued to enjoin the state from
enforcing a statute restricting the size and weight of trucks permitted
on state highways. The suit alleged that the statute was discriminatory
necessary existence of the States, and, within their proper spheres, the independent authority of
the States, is distinctly recognized." Id. at 76.
151. See Kaden, Politics, Money, and State Sovereignty: The Judicial Role, 79 COLUM. L.
REV. 847, 855 (1979) (maintaining that "[tihe ultimate justification for federalism . . . must be
found in its potential to merge the advantages of localism for enhancing liberty with the necessity
of a national government to cope with threats to security and prosperity"); Stewart, Federalism
and Rights, 19 GA. L. REV. 917 (1985) (stating that "[flederalism seeks to maintain political decen-
tralization and social diversity while simultaneously promoting national measures to meet national
needs and prevent localized oppression").
152. See Stern, supra note 107, at 284-85 (noting that "[tihe ease with which the public and
the judiciary now swallow the federal regulation of what were once deemed exclusively local mat-
ters undoubtedly reflects the general integration of the nation, in disregard of state lines"); see
also Kaden, supra note 151, at 854.
153. See Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 547 (1954); see
also Kilpatrick, The Case for "States' Rights", in A NATION OF STATES: ESSAYS ON THE AMERICAN
FEDERAL SYSTEM 100 (R. Goldwin ed. 1961) [hereinafter A NATION OF STATES] (essay quoting Roth
v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 503-06 (1957) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
154. See H. STORING, supra note 30, at 15.
155. Kaden, supra note 151, at 854. The author states that "[d]espite the homogenizing ef-
fects of media and mobility on twentieth-century American life, the existence of separate state and
local governmental units still provides avenues for expressions of the variations in style in different
parts of the country." Id.; see also H. STORING, supra note 30, at 11.
156. Even when Congress has not chosen to regulate an activity, the commerce clause re-
stricts state action by implication. The "negative commerce clause" prevents states from discrimi-
nating against interstate commerce in favor of local businesses or industries.
157. 303 U.S. 177 (1938).
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and burdened interstate commerce in a manner inconsistent with the
commerce clause. The Court held that use of state highways was a pe-
culiarly local concern 158 and, because there was no overt discrimination
against out-of-state interests, the state had the power to determine how
its highways would be used. 159 The Barnwell Bros. Court recognized
that some issues are best left to state determination. 60
The Supreme Court has also acknowledged the importance of local
variation by deferring to local values for the definition of obscenity.
The test, which requires an examination of "contemporary community
standards," was first adopted in Roth v. United States.' Justice
Harlan, in his dissent to that case,'6 2 elaborated on the importance of
permitting state diversity. The Constitution, he argued, secured to the
states the prerogative to have varying concepts of morality' by differ-
entiating between the areas of conduct subject to state regulation and
the areas subject to federal control.6 By imposing a uniform definition
of obscenity, the federal obscenity statute infringed on the state role
and should have been found unconstitutional.
Although a large federal government may be desirable because it
cannot be dominated by the concerns of a local majority, 65 it is pre-
cisely this detachment of Congress that renders it inadequate for local
regulation.'66 Due to modern technology, local problems often are per-
ceived as national crises.6 7 The fact remains, however, that solving
158. Id. at 187.
159. Id. at 189.
160. In Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1980), the Court struck
down an Iowa statute that regulated the length of trucks admitted onto that state's highways.
Although the statute was similar to the one in Barnwell Bros., the Court held that the Iowa law
substantially burdened interstate commerce without significantly increasing safety. Id. at 671. In
fact, Justice Brennan, who concurred in the judgment, argued that the statute was not motivated
by safety concerns at all; rather, Iowa's actual purpose was protectionist and per se unconstitu-
tional. Id. at 685 (Brennan, J., concurring). The holding in Kassel does not undermine the princi-
ples of Barnwell Bros. because the Court repeatedly emphasized the state's prerogative to legislate
for peculiar concerns of its own citizens. The problem for Iowa was that the burden on commerce
was not outweighed by the significance of the countervailing state interest. Id. at 678.
161. 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957).
162. Justice Harlan did not dissent from the adoption of the "community standards" test for
determination of obscenity. His objection was based on the belief that the federal statute under
which the defendant was convicted was beyond the scope of congressional power. Id. at 503-08
(Harlan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
163. Id. at 506.
164. Id. at 503.
165. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 58 (J. Madison) (H. Lodge ed. 1908); see also Rapaczynski,
supra note 129, at 382.
166. Wechsler, supra note 153, at 545. The author asserts that national action is likely to
impose control in areas where the politically dominant local judgment finds control unnecessary, or
it attenuates control in areas where it is really needed. When the need is not uniform throughout
the country, hostile interests in Congress attack the legislation and dilute it. Id.
167. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 581 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (pointing out that in the eighteenth
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"problems" is not the only function of local regulation. The shift of
control to the national legislature has handicapped the states' ability to
develop policies that reflect the values and attitudes of the local popu-
lation before issues of apparent national proportion are addressed in
Congress.
B. Advantages of Small Size
As the country grows and the federal government expands, a large
bureaucracy is evolving to administer national regulation. Because peo-
ple are baffled by the complexity of the bureaucracy, they become dis-
couraged and do not participate.168 Furthermore, people do not develop
loyalty to a monolithic government16 9 and do not respect the law when
they see no local connection. ° In its report entitled Citizen Participa-
tion in the American Federal System, the Advisory Commission on In-
tergovernmental Relations recognized that the ideal of citizen
participation is likely to be more frequent and diversified at the local
level rather than at state and federal levels.1 71 Decisionmaking in
smaller units maximizes the opportunity for individual involvement in
government.17
2
State and local governments are also more accountable to their
constituencies.7 3 State and local representatives are accessible because
they are more likely to be friends and neighbors of the average citi-
zen. 74 Furthermore, because states are smaller, information regarding
the performance of representatives is more readily available 75 and the
citizenry knows whom to hold responsible.17 6 Moreover, restraints, in-
century "technology had not yet converted every local problem into a national one"); see also
Stern, supra note 107, at 284-85.
168. Diamond, What the Framers Meant by Federalism, in A NATION OF STATES, supra note
153, at 35; see also H. LASKI, THE AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 167 (1948). Laski observes: "[Citizens]
tend to feel that what is done by a government institution is bound to be less well done than if it
were undertaken by individuals, whether alone or in the form of private corporations." Id.
169. See THE FEDERALIST No. 17, at 98 (A. Hamilton) (H. Lodge ed. 1908) (arguing that,
because state governments are closer to the people and more visible, citizens will be more loyal to
the states).
170. H. STORING, supra note 30, at 16-17. How often, for example, have we heard a tax-
evader justify his actions on the grounds that he is only cheating the IRS?
171. ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN THE
AMERICAN FEDERAL SYSTEM 95 (1980); see also Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi,
456 U.S. 742, 789 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
172. Kaden, supra note 151, at 853.
173. Id. at 854.
174. THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 292-93 (J. Madison) (H. Lodge ed. 1908).
175. Kaden, supra note 151, at 854.
176. Id. at 857. Professor Kaden recognized that regulation through the use of conditional
federal grants creates a special problem because "the people are necessarily unsure which of their
representatives may be called to account: the federal officials who issued the directive, or the state
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cluding recall and referenda, can be applied more easily at the local
level. 177
Massachusetts' recent experience with a seatbelt law poignantly il-
lustrates the easier application of referenda at the local level. In 1985
the Massachusetts legislature passed a statute requiring the use of
seatbelts for all occupants of motor vehicles. 7 " Opponents of the law
organized and successfully petitioned for a binding referendum on the
regulation. In a state-wide vote the statute was struck down. Despite
the response of Massachusetts' citizens, other states have retained or
enacted seatbelt legislation. If the regulation had been established by
Congress, however, it is unlikely that the citizenry of a single state
could have effected the repeal of the legislation. Only at the state level
can a local majority the size of Massachusetts consistently influence
public policy.
Because there are more representatives of a given population in
state government than in Congress, state and local governments are
more democratic.'79 It may be more than just numbers, however. Justice
Powell, in his Garcia dissent, explained that the unelected members of
the federal bureaucracy know less about the services traditionally ren-
dered by the states and, therefore, are less responsive to the recipients
than are state institutions. 80 Moreover, because federal government of-
ficials often move back and forth between the federal and state bureau-
cracies, their commitment may be to the expansion and the
maintenance of the public services that they supervise. Thus, in the
process of federal policy making, a local population's views could be
represented by public officials with a direct connection to national pro-
grams rather than local values and attitudes.' As a result, Congress
has become less representative of local interests and more accessible to
various national constituencies." 2 Preserving the role of the states
officials who responded to it." Id. at 890; see also Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 456 U.S. at
787. Justice O'Connor in Federal Energy Regulatory Commission wrote: "Congressional compul-
sion of state agencies . . . blurs the lines of political accountability and leaves citizens feeling that
their representatives are no longer responsive to local needs." Id.
177. Kilpatrick, supra note 153, at 101; see also Rapaczynski, supra note 129, at 403.
178. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 7BB (West Supp. 1988) (repealed Nov. 4, 1986). The
Massachusetts statute apparently arose as a response to federal regulation of the automobile in-
dustry. See 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 (1987) (providing for relaxation of automobile safety standards
upon passage of mandatory seatbelt laws applying to at least two-thirds of the country's
population).
179. The Anti-Federalists argued that the national legislature was too small to adequately
represent the interests, feelings, and opinions of the population. State legislatures, on the other
hand, were large enough to be more democratic. H. STORING, supra note 30, at 17.
180. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 577 (Powell, J., dissenting).
181. Kaden, supra note 151, at 867.
182. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 565 n.9 (Powell, J., dissenting); see also Rapaczynski, supra note
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could be the best way to ensure democratic regulation.
C. States as Social Laboratories
Another advantage of state regulation is that states can function as
laboratories for social experimentation.' 83 The large and complex fed-
eral bureaucracy cannot deal quickly and effectively with highly com-
plex social and political problems that may merit radically new
approaches. 8 4 Insiders claim that among federal regulatory agencies
there is a strong resistance to considering alternative and innovative
approaches to problems. 8 5 Even with less complex problems, state gov-
ernments have the luxury of experimentation without the fear that the
entire nation will be jeopardized by their errors in judgment.' Thus,
even when states and the federal government have the same goals, each
state has the flexibility to take a different approach using its own judg-
ment in response to the idiosyncrasies of its population, economy, and
geography.'
D. The Political Process Theory Revisited
Despite the conflict between the political process theory of Garcia
and the text of the Constitution,"8 several commentators have sug-
gested that judicial intervention is unnecessary when congressional
commerce legislation infringes on state authority. Professor Herbert
Wechsler has argued that the Court need not protect the states from
129, at 392-93 (arguing that federal representatives increasingly depend on national and local pri-
vate interests and less on local majorities and consequently the less well-organized can only suc-
ceed on the state level).
183. Kaden, supra note 151, at 854.
184. H. SEIDMAN & R. GILMORE, POLITICS, POSITION, AND PowER. FROM THE POSITIVE TO THE
REGULATORY STATE 330 (4th ed. 1986).
185. Lilley & Miller, The New "Social Regulation", 47 PUB. INTEREST 49, 57 (1977).
186. States were responsible for innovations such as zero-based budgeting, equal housing,
and no-fault insurance. States also took the lead in gun control, pregnancy benefits for working
women, limited-access highways, education for handicapped children, auto pollution standards,
and energy assistance for the poor. ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, STATE
AND LocAL ROLES IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 62-63 (1982). As Justice Brandeis noted in his dissent to
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932), "[i]t is one of the happy incidents of the
federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and
try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country." Id. at 311
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
187. But see Rapaczynski, supra note 129, at 408-14. Professor Rapaczynski lists six reasons
why the social laboratory theory may be overrated: (a) state boundaries may be inefficient divi-
sions of territory; (b) state regulation often does affect sister states; (c) local solutions are hindered
by an unwillingness to disadvantage local industries; (d) local innovation may be too expensive for
local government to bear; (e) federal bureaucrats can innovate without fear of political reprisal;
and, (f) uniformity can be an advantage. Id.
188. See supra notes 129-48 and accompanying text.
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federal action because the states' representatives control the legislative
process. Theoretically, therefore, the states themselves have sanctioned
the challenged act of Congress. 189 Professor Jesse Choper, expanding on
Wechsler's theory, has recommended that the Court, rather than ex-
pending judicial authority by invalidating commerce regulation, should
use its limited power to protect individual rights.190 The political pro-
cess ultimately will establish the proper balance between state, local,
and federal roles.
For the political process to function as Professors Wechsler and
Choper assume it will, several criteria must be met. First, the citizenry
must be sufficiently informed about the actions of their congressional
representatives. Second, the representatives must be responsive to the
protestations and suggestions of their constituencies. Third, local ma-
jorities, through their congressional representatives, must have the
power to influence national policies. In other words, the political safe-
guards of federalism require a national government that is accountable,
responsive, and democratic. The paradoxical result of the political pro-
cess theory is that the weakest attributes of the federal government
must be relied upon to protect individuals from federal action which is
objectionable because the government lacks those .attributes. If the fed-
eral government were accountable, responsive, and democratic, then
state regulations would not be preferable. For the same reasons that
state regulation is preferred over federal regulation, the national politi-
cal process is inadequate to protect federalism.
In 1971 Justice Black declared that federalism does not require
Congress to blindly defer to "states' rights" any more than it requires
every important issue to be controlled by our national government. 9'
For the past two hundred years the Supreme Court has attempted to
reach a balance between these two extremes by devising a commerce
clause doctrine broad enough to support needed federal legislation
while simultaneously incorporating some restrictions on federal dis-
placement of state authority over local activities. The ability of the
modern commerce power to justify legislation such as the Polygraph
Act' 92 indicates that the rational basis test, especially after Garcia, in-
sufficiently protects individuals from unnecessary federal regulation.
The time has come for a new approach to the interstate commerce
clause, and Part IV of this Note proposes one.
189. Wechsler, supra note 153, at 559.
190. J. CHOPER, supra note 149, at 171-258.
191. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971). Justice Black wrote that "the Framers re-
jected both these courses." Id.
192. See supra notes 1-9 and accompanying text.
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IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL EXERCISE OF FEDERAL POLICE POWER
For the past century, but more frequently since 1937, Congress has
exercised its power over interstate commerce to promote and to protect
the public health, welfare, and morality. The Supreme Court has held
that as long as such regulations of commerce do not infringe upon any
constitutional prohibitions, they are within Congress' commerce power,
regardless of their motive or purpose. 193 As a consequence, the inter-
state commerce clause has evolved from a remedial measure, preventing
economic Balkanization and facilitating commerce, into the source of
unrestrained federal police power. Nowhere in the Constitution is Con-
gress expressly granted the power to enact police legislation. The ques-
tion, then, is whether any federal police power is implied in the
Constitution'94 and if so, what are the limitations of that power?
Developing a commerce clause doctrine requires a determination of
which government-state, local, or federal-ought to govern a certain
activity. For example, when the Supreme Court is called upon to deter-
mine the scope of the federal executive or legislative power in the sepa-
ration of powers context, the Court engages in an analysis focusing on
the functional characteristics of the branch under scrutiny.'95 Many
commentators have suggested that this functional analysis is the proper
approach to all separation of powers issues.196 In other words, when a
193. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115 (1941). The Supreme Court was not always so
willing to ignore congressional objectives. In M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819),
the Court wrote that the federal powers were not unlimited but "[l]et the end be legitimate, let it
be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly
adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the consti-
tution, are constitutional." Id. at 421. Under modern doctrine, however, objectives are immaterial
and the fact that "Congress [is] legislating against moral wrongs . . . render[s] its enactments no
less valid." Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 257 (1964).
194. The notion of implied federal powers originated in M'Culloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316.
In M'Culloch the Court began its inquiry into the constitutionality of a federal bank by noting
that the power to incorporate such a bank was not expressly enumerated in the Constitution. Id. at
409. However, the Court went on to find that incorporating a federal bank was a legitimate means
of exercising delegated powers and there was, therefore, an implied power. Id. at 411.
195. See, e.g., Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 749 (1982) (holding that immunity from
damages liability is a "functionally mandated incident" of the presidency). The functional analysis
approach to separation of powers issues has its roots in Justice Jackson's concurrence to Youngs-
town Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (The Steel Seizure Case), 343 U.S. 579 (1952). Justice Jackson
outlined three situations in which the Supreme Court might be called upon to officiate between the
two political branches and concluded that when there was a direct conflict "any actual test of
power is likely to depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables. . . ." Id.
at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring) (citation omitted); see also Banks, Efficiency in Government: Sep-
aration of Powers Reconsidered, 35 SYRACUSE L. REV. 715, 728-30 (1984) (discussing the Court's
use of functional analysis in the separation of powers context); Bruff, On the Constitutional Sta-
tus of the Administrative Agencies, 36 AM. U.L. Rav. 491, 502-06 (1987).
196. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, A Paradox Without a Principle: A Comment on the Burger
Court's Jurisprudence in Separation of Powers Cases, 60 S. CAL. L. REv. 1083, 1109-11 (1987)
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power is not expressly delegated to one branch, the Court should in-
quire which branch is best able to exercise the power and infer from the
constitutional text that the power is assigned to that branch.
A functional inquiry ought to be as valuable in the federalism con-
text as in the separation of powers context.197 This approach to federal-
ism has the added advantage of an historical basis in the framing of the
Constitution. Section eight of article one was developed from an outline
offered by the Virginia delegation to the Philadelphia Convention."9 8
The Virginia Plan proposed a federal legislature empowered to legislate
in all cases in which the several states were incompetent or in which the
harmony of the relationship between the states would be threatened by
independent state action.19 9 The Virginia Plan can be viewed as the
Framers' appraisal of the necessary functions of a federal government.
The enumeration of section eight is a list of all the occasions in which
federal action is required; that is, when the federal government is best
suited to govern. Presumably, if a situation arises that fits into the Vir-
ginia Plan, then Congress should have been granted, either expressly or
implicitly, the power to legislate in that case. The exercise of federal
police power, therefore, ought to be constitutional when it is consistent
with the Virginia Plan.
The Framers uniformly considered it imperative to remove from
the states the power to obstruct interstate and foreign commerce. As a
practical matter, the thirteen states could not operate as a single nation
if the states retained power over commerce. The remedial effect of the
commerce clause, therefore, ensures an integrated national economy
when interstate and international transactions are unobstructed by in-
dividual state legislation. 00 By removing this legislative power from the
states, however, the commerce clause creates situations in which state
regulations are an unconstitutional or inadequate response to legitimate
(describing a three-part functional analysis for separation of powers cases); Strauss, The Place of
Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573
(1984) (advocating a functional analysis approach to decide the constitutionality of administrative
agencies).
197. Cf. Rapaczynski, supra note 129, at 345 (noting that the Court has not chosen to focus
on a "functional analysis of the role of the states in the federal system").
198. See M. FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 68 (1913).
199. Id. at 226. The Virginia Plan states: "Resolved that. . . the National Legislature ought
to be impowered. . . to legislate in all cases to which the separate States are incompetent, or in
which the harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the exercise of individual Legisla-
tion .. " Id.
200. See, e.g., Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (striking down a New Jersey
statute restricting the importation of waste generated outside the state); Hunt v. Washington Ap-
ple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977) (striking down a North Carolina statute regulating
the labeling of imported apples); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951) (striking
down a city ordinance regulating milk that had been processed by foreign companies).
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local or national problems. When problems are unsolvable because of
the commerce clause, then, out of necessity, that clause should em-
power Congress to enact federal police legislation. In other words, the
federal government may exercise police power constitutionally when, as
a practical matter, it is the best or only government able to exercise
that power. The remainder of this Note discusses some of the situations
in which federal police power ought to be constitutional.
A. Avoidance of Interstate Competition Compromises
In an ideal world a state government would legislate for the welfare
of its citizens after considering local values, conditions, and public opin-
ion. The legislation would represent accurately the unique values of
that state's population and be tailored to satisfy the majority. In most
cases, the state political process functions according to this model. In
some cases, however, the legislative process is distorted by the realities
of interstate commerce because a state must consider the effect that
police regulation will have on local businesses. In those cases, the state
political process does not work and the result is a compromise that is
not representative of public opinion. Because the commerce clause cre-
ates the problem, the federal commerce power must be invoked to solve
it.
The labor standards established by the FLSA and sustained in
Darby'01 illustrate the kind of situation in which federal legislation pro-
tects the general welfare better than state legislation. Absent the com-
merce clause, states would be able to choose, based on local values and
conditions, a minimum wage and maximum hour work week. In Geor-
gia, for example, the legislature might establish a low minimum wage
and longer work week given the low cost of living and agrarian tradition
in that state. On the other hand, the New York legislature might man-
date higher wages and shorter hours. As a result, Georgia products, be-
cause they are manufactured by cheaper labor, could be sold for less
than New York products. New York might make its products more
competitive within the state by imposing tariffs on goods imported from
other states, and it might subsidize exports to make New York products
less expensive in other states. Eventually, other states would retaliate
and the result would be a trade war of the type that existed under the
Articles of Confederation.
Fortunately, the commerce clause prevents interstate trade wars.
By the same token, however, it prevents states from protecting local
industry from the consequences of federal legislation for the public
201. 312 U.S. 100 (1941). For a discussion of Darby, see supra notes 79-89 and accompanying
text.
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health and welfare.2"2 In short, by insisting that states consider the ef-
fects of social regulation on local competitiveness, the commerce clause
ensures that states cannot regulate purely on the basis of local values
and conditions. Once one state establishes a standard, no state can af-
ford to exceed it. Thus, to paraphrase Justice Brandeis, a single coura-
geous state may not try novel social and economic experiments without
crippling its local businesses.20
In situations in which local competitiveness is jeopardized by indi-
vidual state police regulation, a national regulatory minimum is estab-
lished by default. The states are unable to utilize their own judgment
and must instead capitulate to the lowest common denominator. In
those cases, congressional regulation does not infringe on state preroga-
tives because Congress' judgment is not being substituted for that of
the states. In fact, federal legislation is the only reflection of legislative
judgment untainted by outside considerations.0 4 When the state legis-
lative process is distorted by considerations of the consequences that
regulations will have on local business and industry, the commerce
power is exercised constitutionally to override state authority.
According to this analysis, National League of Cities was correctly
decided but for the wrong reasons.20 5 The problem with extending the
FLSA to cover state employees is not that it offends notions of federal-
ism for Congress to regulate states,208 but that federal police legislation
is unnecessary. State legislatures are competent to determine state em-
ployee wages, hours, and working conditions, because state employees,
unlike private employees, do not produce any goods to compete in the
interstate market. Local judgment, therefore, is not tainted by consider-
ations of competitiveness. The decision to pay state employees less than
every other state in the Union has completely local repercussions and,
therefore, creates no need for federal intervention.
B. Facilitation Through Uniformity
The previous section suggested that federal police power should be
constitutional in situations in which the commerce clause impairs the
ability of states to consider the welfare, safety, or morality of the pub-
lic. Federal legislation also would be constitutional when, in addition to
protecting the public, it promotes the goals of the commerce clause-
202. See Stern, supra note 21, at 883.
203. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
204. Congress can use its power over foreign commerce to protect American products manu-
factured under better working conditions from competition with products from foreign countries.
205. See supra notes 122-28 and accompanying text.
206. If this were true then every federal conditional grant to the states would be unconstitu-
tional as an infringement on state sovereignty prohibited by the tenth amendment.
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namely, the integration of the national economy and the free flow of
goods across state lines. When national uniformity facilitates interstate
transactions in a way that individual state regulation cannot, then fed-
eral police legislation is consistent with the Virginia Plan and ought to
be permissible.
The Pure Food and Drug Act, sustained in Hipolite Egg Co. v.
United States,0 7 is an example of legislation that facilitates interstate
transactions through national uniformity. Federal food and drug laws
are police regulations in that they set national standards for purity and
safety. In Hipolite the Court found that the statute, in addition to pro-
moting safety, was designed to facilitate interstate commerce in food
and prescription drugs by assuring consumers that products throughout
the country conformed to the same standards. 08 The facilitation aspect
of the law should save this legislation from nullification as an invalid
exercise of federal police power.
A result contrary to the one reached by the Hipolite Court would
be unacceptable. Imagine the burden on interstate transactions if each
state had its own standards for food and drugs. A safety-conscious resi-
dent of Tennessee, for example, would have to know the standards of
every state in order to protect himself from impure food. Each state
would be forced to institute an elaborate inspection system so that con-
sumers would know which products conform to local standards. More-
over, the negative commerce clause, which forbids state discrimination
against goods from other states, might even prevent states from taking
certain kinds of action against imported products that do not meet the
state's safety standards.0 9
Federal food and drug legislation facilitates interstate commerce
and seems crucial to an integrated national economy. Although both the
states and Congress would have the same objectives in food and drug
legislation, state regulation would defeat the goal of the commerce
clause and hinder both interstate and foreign commerce. The Court
should not invalidate a federal statute that facilitates commerce by es-
tablishing national uniformity even though the objective of the legisla-
tion is the protection of individuals.
Congress, however, could conceivably tie every piece of legislation
207. 220 U.S. 45 (1911). For a discussion of Hipolite Egg, see supra notes 52-59 and accom-
panying text. The case was decided prior to the development of the modern commerce clause
doctrine. Under the rational basis test, food and drug regulation is constitutional because Congress
could reasonably conclude that the activity of producing and selling adulterated products would
have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.
208. Hipolite Egg Co., 220 U.S. at 55.
209. See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 471 (1981) (stating that even
"[w]hen legislating in areas of legitimate local concern, such as environmental protection and re-
source conservation, States are nonetheless limited by the Commerce Clause").
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to a desire for national uniformity. The Supreme Court, therefore,
ought to be wary of such conduct and be willing to scrutinize congres-
sional motivations. For example, Congress has determined that a na-
tional policy on employer use of polygraph examinations is desirable.21 0
In fact, the House Committee on Education and Labor found that the
lack of uniformity enabled employers to circumvent state regulations. 11
The Polygraph Act, however, is not a reasonable means of facilitating
interstate and foreign commerce because there is no rational connection
between the examination of an employee and the marketability of goods
he manufactures. While a single state's attempt to ensure that food and
drugs are safe obstructs interstate commerce, 1 2 a state's decision to
regulate polygraph tests has no effect on commerce at all. In facilitation
cases, therefore, the Court should look at the consequences of state ac-
tion not inaction.
This scrutinization of legislative intent leads to the conclusion that
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 cannot be justified as a constitutional exer-
cise of federal police power under the commerce clause. According to
the Court's reasoning and the legislative history, federal civil rights leg-
islation was necessary because the failure of states to eliminate racial
discrimination set up artificial barriers to interstate commerce. 3 While
it was true in 1964 that state tolerance of private discrimination
through inaction discouraged travel and investment in that state, the
only harm, other than the serious injury to individual rights, was to
that state. Moreover, states were free to eliminate local discrimination
without burdening interstate commerce.
Although the Civil Rights Act would not survive scrutiny under
this Note's proposed interpretation of the commerce clause, the Act
probably is justifiable as an exercise of congressional power granted in
the Civil War Amendments. 14 While detailed consideration of this pro-
position is beyond the scope of this Note, several cases have interpreted
the enabling clauses of the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments to
permit congressional regulation of private discrimination. For example,
in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,21 5 the Supreme Court held that sec-
210. HOUSE COMM. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, REPORT ON EMPLOYEE POLYGRAPH PROTECTION
ACT, H.R. REP. No. 208, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9 (1987).
211. Id. at 9.
212. See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
213. For a discussion of the commerce clause rationale for the Civil Rights Act of 1964, see
supra notes 96-106 and accompanying text.
214. The thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments to the Constitution are collec-
tively referred to as the Civil War Amendments.
215. 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (sustaining 42 U.S.C. § 1982 which prohibits discrimination based
on race in the sale or rental of property).
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tion two of the thirteenth amendment21 empowered Congress to deter-
mine the badges and incidents of slavery and legislate to eliminate
them.217 In Katzenbach v. Morgan2l8 the Court gave a similar interpre-
tation to section five of the fourteenth amendment.219 The Court held
that section five authorized Congress to enact legislation to secure the
guarantees of the fourteenth amendment.220 Some commentators also
have interpreted Morgan as conceding to Congress the power to inter-
pret the substantive rights in section one and provide a remedy for
those violations.22' Although Morgan and Jones raise serious separation
of powers questions,222 congressional power to eliminate private dis-
crimination apparently is consistent with the original intent of the
framers and ratifiers of the Civil War Amendments.223
In 1964 the jurisprudence of the Civil War Amendments had not
216. The thirteenth amendment provides in part:
Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude ... shall exist within the United
States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
U.S. CoNST. amend. XIII, §§ 1, 2.
217. Jones, 392 U.S. at 440. See Baldwin, The Thirteenth Amendment as an Effective
Source of Constitutional Authority for Affirmative Action Legislation, 18 COLUM. J.L. & Soc.
PROBS. 77, 103-04 (1983); Cohen, Congressional Power to Interpret Due Process and Equal Protec-
tion, 27 STAN. L. REV. 603, 616 (1975); Howe, Federalism and Civil Rights, in CIVIL RIGHTS, THE
CONSTITUTION, AND THE COURTS 54 (1967).
218. 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (upholding the Voting Rights Act of 1965 which prohibited English
literacy as a prerequisite to the right to vote).
219. The fourteenth amendment provides in part:
Section 1.. . . No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the pro-
visions of this article.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §§ 1, 5.
220. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 651.
221. Baldwin, supra note 217, at 107; see also Cohen, supra note 217, at 605.
222. The Supreme Court has carefully guarded its role as final interpreter of the Constitu-
tion. By permitting Congress to interpret the substantive rights created by the thirteenth and
fourteenth amendments, the Court radically changes the scope of congressional power. Commenta-
tors have asserted that, in the case of the Civil War Amendments, the Court's role should be
adjusted. For example, Professor Cohen argues that section five is a federalism clause granting
Congress the power to determine whether governmental action should be taken. Relying on Profes-
sor Wechsler's theory of judicial abstention, see supra note 189 and accompanying text, Cohen
promotes judicial deference to the political branches on fourteenth amendment issues. Cohen,
supra note 217, at 614; see also Baldwin, supra note 217, at 108-13 (arguing that the enabling
clauses of the Civil War Amendments merit special treatment by the Court including deference to
congressional fact-finding). See generally G. STONE, L. SEIMAN, C. SUNSTEIN & M. TUSHNET. CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW 238-45 (1986).
223. See generally C. ANTIEAU, THE ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE FOURTEENTH AMEND-
MENT (1981).
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developed past the construction that had defeated the Civil Rights Act
of 1875.24 Since 1964 the Supreme Court has taken a more expansive
view of congressional power under the Civil War Amendments and this
modern interpretation likely is capable of supporting civil rights legisla-
tion currently justified under the commerce clause. There is no way to
determine, however, whether this more expansive view can support civil
rights legislation because most modern civil rights legislation is based
on the commerce power. Permitting the expansion of the commerce
clause beyond reasonable boundaries not only has "perverted 22 5 the
constitutional text, but also has frozen the jurisprudence of the Civil
War Amendments.
C. Protection of National Resources
As the discussion in the last section intimated, state legislation that
inhibits interstate commerce is unacceptable. Similarly, when state leg-
islation, or the lack thereof, threatens national interests, the country
cannot afford to permit a state to function as a legislative laboratory
because the risk cannot be confined to that state. In these rare cases
congressional interference is warranted.
One of the situations that merits federal action occurs when na-
tional resources, whether natural or otherwise, cannot be protected ade-
quately by the independent legislation of individual states. The state
resources must be protected, even if this protection is detrimental to
the local population, and this protection can only be afforded through
national action.
In Wickard v. Filburn2 26 the statute at issue regulated the national
224. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. Commentators recognized in 1964 that the
use of the commerce clause was a calculated effort to avoid that early precedent. For example,
Professor Gunther reacted as follows:
The proposed end run by way of the commerce clause seems to me [ill-advised].
It would, I think, pervert the meaning and purpose of the commerce clause to invoke it as
the basis for this legislation.. . . The Fourteenth Amendment, after all, [specifically] focuses
on the problem of racial discrimination; and the fifth section of the Amendment as well as the
Necessary and Proper Clause speak to congressional power to enforce it. [I] would much pre-
fer to see the Government channel its resources of ingenuity and advocacy into the develop-
ment of a viable interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment .. .. [I]t would carry the
incidental benefit of giving the Department the opportunity to aid the Supreme Court in the
fashioning of a more adequate rationale for the modern scope of the Fourteenth Amendment
than is now apparent . . .
Letter from Gerald Gunther to Department of Justice (June 5, 1963) [hereinafter Gunther Letter],
reprinted in G. GUNTHER, supra note 20, at 163.
225. See Gunther Letter, supra note 224.
226. 317 U.S. 111 (1942). For a discussion of Wickard, see supra notes 90-95 and accompany-
ing text.
[Vol. 41:1019
FEDERAL POLICE POWER
wheat market at a time of economic depression.227 The congressional
objective was to protect farmers from dramatic price fluctuations that
led to farm failures and jeopardized the entire food supply.228 No state
acting independently could have achieved that objective; thus, congres-
sional action was necessary to coordinate the market. Even though the
AAA regulated a purely intrastate activity as to Filburn, Congress could
constitutionally reach that local activity because the separate states
were incompetent to protect the wheat supply.
The National Labor Relations Act sustained in Jones & Laughlin
presents a similar situation.229 In Jones & Laughlin the NLRA was en-
forced against the fourth largest steel and iron producer in the country.
Had labor unrest stopped production at the Aliquippa plant, a general
strike might have crippled the nation. Moreover, Jones & Laughlin was
not a case in which the social laboratory concept was applicable. A leg-
islative experiment by Pennsylvania might have had substantial reper-
cussions for the entire nation. The NLRA, as applied to Jones &
Laughlin and similar corporations, was constitutional as an exercise of
power necessary to protect the nation by establishing a national policy.
D. Interstate Transportation of Hazardous Articles
Just as federal regulation is justified when national resources are
threatened by the legislative experimentation of a single state, federal
regulation may be justified when the action or inaction of a single state
jeopardizes the local resources of another state. According to the Vir-
ginia Plan, the Constitution was to permit national legislation when in-
dividual state regulation would threaten the harmony of relations
between states. Although there are few situations in modern America in
which interstate relations are at issue, Congress should maintain the
power to remedy situations giving rise to such friction.
One situation with the potential to create interstate arguments oc-
curs when the transportation of articles from one state might result in
damage in another state. For example, Congress has prohibited the in-
terstate transportation of plant pests without the authorization of the
Secretary of Agriculture.230 The Animal and Plant Health Inspection
227. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125-26 (recounting the problems caused by surplus wheat includ-
ing volatile prices, railroad car tie-ups, and overburdened grain elevators).
228. Id. at 128. The Court stated: "One of the primary purposes of the Act. . . was to in-
crease the market price of wheat, and to that end to limit the volume thereof that could affect the
market." Id.
229. See supra notes 68-77 and accompanying text.
230. 7 U.S.C. § 150bb (1982). Section 150gg provides for civil and criminal penalties for vio-
lation of § 150bb. 7 U.S.C. § 150gg (Supp. 1988). The Secretary is empowered to develop rules and
regulations to implement this prohibition. 7 U.S.C. § 150ee (1982).
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Service of the Department of Agriculture promulgated regulations
prohibiting the transportation of citrus fruits bearing the citrus canker
virus from quarantined areas to citrus-producing areas of the United
States."' The entire state of Florida was under quarantine2 32 until Feb-
ruary 9, 1988, when the Service ruled that the export of Florida citrus
fruits to other citrus-producing states posed no danger to the fruit
crops of those areas.23
The problem of infected fruits seems particularly suited to federal
legislation. Assuming that individual states constitutionally could re-
strict the importation of Florida citrus, the potential friction that would
arise from this action would be unacceptable. Florida's citrus growers
no doubt would resent any state legislation directed at the Florida cit-
rus crop even if there were legitimate reasons for such action. Retalia-
tion might be an appealing response for Florida. Moreover, citrus-
producing states would have a tempting constitutional means of in-
creasing the local competitiveness of their own fruit though no actual
danger was posed by exposure to infected fruit.2 4 Regulations enacted
by Congress or an administrative agency, which Florida has the same
opportunity to influence as any other state, eliminate this potential
friction.
E. Local Hazards which Cross State Lines
Under the Virginia Plan, Congress was to have power to regulate in
all cases in which the states, acting separately, could not achieve the
desired national goal. For example, congressional regulation would be
necessary when a local hazard cannot be contained by a single state and
the hazard threatens surrounding states. In this case, the problem does
not necessarily arise from the integrated national economy but rather
from the contiguous geography of the United States. Once again, Con-
gress should have the constitutional power to solve the problem.
The case of nuclear energy offers a good example of the need for
congressional regulation. When a state determines that nuclear energy
is a safe alternative to more conventional methods of energy produc-
tion, the consequences of an error in judgment do not abide by state
boundaries. A radioactive cloud created by an accident in Oregon may
have deadly consequences for the entire nation. The only opportunity
for Ohio, for example, to influence the actions of Oregon regarding nu-
clear power is through Congress. Congress, therefore, should make deci-
231. 7 C.F.R. § 301.75 (1988).
232. Id. § 301.75-3.
233. 53 Fed. Reg. 3999 (1988) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. §§ 301.75 to 301.75-16).
234. See id. (concluding the risk posed is minimal).
1054 [Vol. 41:1019
FEDERAL POLICE POWER
sions involving the welfare of all of the states. By setting a national
minimum, the federal legislature can ensure that all states are not jeop-
ardized by the policy decisions of a single state.
This congressional action, however, should set only a minimum.
Nothing should prevent a state from choosing more stringent require-
ments when the local majority prefers them. The purpose of permitting
federal regulation is to protect one state from the errors in judgment of
another state. Once that purpose is accomplished, the federal role is
fulfilled. Congress may determine that certain safety regulations protect
California from mistakes in Nevada, but California still may desire to
better protect both Nevada and itself from Californian accidents. More
stringent safety regulations do not conflict with the national policy and
should remain the prerogative of California.3 5
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court must take an active role in defining the limits
of congressional power to regulate individual conduct. Practically
speaking, the present construct used by the Court places no restrictions
on Congress, and Garcia seems to indicate that the Court has resigned
itself to this situation. Limits on congressional power to regulate under
the commerce clause should be developed. This Note proposes an ap-
proach to develop a more useful construct that focuses on the underly-
ing federalist framework of the Constitution. The list of categories of
constitutional police power legislation in Part IV is not exhaustive and
other situations might warrant its expansion. It is the obligation of the
Supreme Court, however, as the final interpreter of the Constitution, to
ensure that the list does not become infinite.
Alan N. Greenspan*
235. Cf. Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707 (1985). In
Hillsborough the Court held that county ordinances regulating the collection of blood plasma were
not preempted by the extensive federal regulation of the industry. In a footnote to the unanimous
opinion, the Court pointed out that "[t]he federal interest at stake here is to ensure minimum
standards, not uniform standards." Id. at 722 n.5. But cf. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy
Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983). In Pacific Gas the Court was
presented with a California statute requiring potential builders of atomic energy plants to show
that provisions had been made for the storage and disposal of the spent fuel. Id. at 194. The
appellant alleged that the state law had been preempted by the extensive federal regulatory
scheme. Id. at 204. The Court rejected the preemption argument on the grounds that the federal
regulations preempted only those state statutes motivated by safety concerns. Id. at 213. Since
California's laws were designed to avoid uneconomical investment in nuclear power, the federal
laws did not preempt the state law. Id. at 216. Had the state statutes been for the protection of the
public health, however, they would have been superseded.
* The Author would like to thank Thomas R. McCoy, Professor of Law, and Barry Friedman,
Assistant Professor of Law, at Vanderbilt University School of Law for their comments on earlier
drafts of this Note.
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